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Abstract
It is generally believed that one argument advanced by Aristotle in favor of 
the political authority of the multitude is that large groups can make better 
decisions by pooling their knowledge than individuals or small groups can 
make alone. This is supported by two analogies, one apparently involving a 
“potluck dinner” and the other aesthetic judgment. This article suggests that 
that interpretation of Aristotle’s argument is implausible given the historical 
context and several features of the text. It argues that Aristotle’s support for 
the rule of the multitude rested not on its superior knowledge but rather on 
his belief that the virtue of individuals can be aggregated and even amplified 
when they act collectively. This significantly alters our understanding of Aris-
totle’s political thought and presents a powerful alternative to the epistemic 
defenses of mass political activity popular today.
Keywords
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Almost twenty years ago, Jeremy Waldron published a widely admired 
account of an argument made by Aristotle in support of the political authority 
of “the many,” as opposed to “the one” or “the few.”1 The key text, from 
Book 3 of the Politics, reads:
For the many (to plēthos), of whom each individual is not a good man 
(spoudaios), when they meet together may be better (beltious) than the 
few good, if regarded not individually but collectively, just as a feast to 
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which many contribute (ta symphorēta deipna) is better than a dinner 
provided out of a single purse (ek mias dapanēs). For each individual 
among the many has a share (morion) of excellence (aretē) and practical 
wisdom (phronēsis), and when they meet together, just as they become 
in a manner one man, who has many feet, and hands, and senses, so too 
with regard to their character (ta ēthē) and thought (dianoia). Hence the 
many are better judges than a single man of music and poetry; for some 
understand one part, and some another, and among them, they under-
stand the whole (allo gar alloi ti morion, panta de pantes).2
Waldron dubbed this argument “the doctrine of the wisdom of the multi-
tude,” or “DWM,” and explicated it as follows. Aristotle thought that “the 
people acting as a body” were “capable of making better decisions, by pool-
ing their knowledge, experience, and insight,” than any single member of 
the body, however excellent, was capable of making on his own.3 Mass 
political activity thus resembled a “potluck dinner”4 or an audience judging 
a play: a greater variety of contributions could produce a better result. This 
reflected decision making in the Athenian assembly. Debating the invasion 
of Sicily, Waldron hypothesized, one citizen might know something about 
the coastline, another Sicilian military capacities, another the costs of such 
expeditions, and so on. From the diverse knowledge of the group there could 
thus emerge the “widest possible acquaintance with the pros and cons,” and 
hence the best possible decision.5
Similar accounts had appeared before,6 but Waldron’s was easily the fullest 
and most elegant and has continued to influence students of democracy and of 
Aristotle alike.7 Certain details remain disputed: for example, whether the 
aggregation of views was fully “dialectical” or more “mechanical,”8 and 
whether citizens themselves possessed knowledge relevant to the subject at 
hand or simply knew who did.9 But Waldron’s three core claims are widely 
accepted. First, that Aristotle’s “feast” is a “potluck dinner.”  This is supported 
by a later appearance of the same analogy, in which “a feast to which all the 
guests contribute” (hestiasis symphorētos) is contrasted with “a banquet fur-
nished by a single man” (mias kai haplēs).10 Second, that the multitude’s con-
tribution to political activity is diverse knowledge, wisdom, insight or 
expertise.11 And third, that this reflects debate in an assembly, as in classical 
Athens.12
Accordingly, Aristotle is widely regarded as a moderate supporter of 
deliberative democracy on epistemic grounds.13 Yet there are reasons to doubt 
this view. The “pooling of knowledge” paradigm certainly fits the intellectual 
aspect of his argument, denoted in the text by phronēsis, “prudence” or “good 
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sense,” and dianoia, “thought.” But how about its ethical aspect, denoted by 
aretē, “virtue” or “excellence,” and ta ēthē, “moral characteristics”? Also, 
Athenian assemblygoers seem to have been better known even among demo-
crats for ignorance rather than knowledge (especially in relation to the inva-
sion of Sicily).14 Is an epistemic account really probable in this context? What 
about the second analogy: can an epistemic approach adequately explain audi-
ence responses to artistic works? And could Aristotle really have found pot-
luck dinners so appealing? Did the ancient Greeks even have potluck 
dinners?
None of these questions has been fully explored; those who doubt the 
argument have simply dismissed it as weak.15 I think we can do better. 
Aristotle was not interested in the benefits of pooling diverse knowledge, but 
in the political authority of aretē, “virtue,” understood in its general sense as 
a capacity for right action encompassing both ethical and intellectual quali-
ties. He was concerned with the quantity of aretē that could be possessed by 
different agents, and his claim in this passage was that some multitudes, when 
they act collectively, can exhibit more aretē than even highly virtuous indi-
viduals. Specifically, I will suggest, he believed that all forms of virtue—
perhaps especially courage and justice, the two that he associated most with 
large numbers—are easier to practice in groups than alone, and this supported 
the view that a multitude could be an effective political agent.
This account fits recognizably within the familiar framework of Aristotelian 
“virtue ethics” (albeit with a twist that connects it to wider issues of collective 
action), which seems preferable to reading the passage as an outlier in Aristotle’s 
writings.16 But if my interpretation is sound, what explains the staying power of 
the former account? One factor is the difficulty of the text: it is highly truncated, 
leading many translators to expand upon it, inserting misleading terms in the 
process—thus giving false preconceptions to readers who have Greek, and pre-
cluding understanding among those who do not.17 Another is the seeming plau-
sibility of the assumption that the contributions made to the “feast” are individual 
dishes. This naturally suggests a “potluck dinner,” valued for its “variety,” and 
the rest follows. A third is the familiarity of epistemic arguments for political 
authority. Since at least Plato, a leading criterion of fitness for rule has been 
appropriate expertise; the current enthusiasm for epistemic defenses of democ-
racy is only the latest incarnation of this approach.18 That Aristotle should have 
advanced a similar argument may thus seem unsurprising. If I am correct, how-
ever, he was engaged in a profoundly different project, which deserves attention 
not only for the sake of getting Aristotle right, but also because it provides a way 
of defending certain forms of mass political activity that may ultimately prove 
more powerful than the epistemic arguments favored today.
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The Conventional Account and Its Weaknesses
The core elements of the accepted account are the “potluck dinner” analogy, 
the claim that the multitude’s contribution to political activity is fuller 
knowledge, and the supposition that this reflects decision making in the 
Athenian assembly. None of these elements is free from difficulty, however, 
as an examination of the text and its context reveals.
The essential feature of Aristotle’s collectively provided feast is that it is 
expected to be better than one provided by a single man. Yet, as others have 
noted, this is hardly a common view of potluck dinners.19 Indeed, in the 
Straussian tradition, it is precisely the improbability of this depiction (along 
with the reference to the “one man” with “many feet, and hands, and senses,” 
which is regarded as “monstrous”) that is taken to show that the whole argu-
ment is ironic.20 Still, most commentators have proven willing to suspend 
disbelief on this point, since potluck dinners would seem to have a natural 
affinity with democracy. Everyone can participate; participation is on equal 
terms; contributions are small; and the results unpredictable. An analogy 
between dishes at a potluck and views in political debate  is visible even at 
the linguistic level: in the words of Josiah Ober, benefits arise when different 
people bring different things “to the table.”21
Yet no matter how natural the “potluck dinner” analogy may seem today, 
there is no evidence that potluck dinners existed in ancient Greece. We have 
plenty of evidence of communal dining22 but none of dinners where guests 
supplied dishes of their own choosing, and the idea fits badly with what we 
know of Greek domestic culture. Gender segregation suggests that any such 
dinner would have been all-male, yet for the same reason, attendees could not 
have cooked their own contributions; that would have been the task of a wife 
or slave.23 So we must imagine a series of Greek men arriving for dinner, each 
bringing a dish prepared by a dependent—and then suppose that this could 
have struck Aristotle as analogous to the production of the citizenry’s autono-
mous political decisions. If we take the point of the analogy to be “variety,” 
further difficulties arise. Classical Greece was not twenty-first century 
America; its culinary traditions were not notably diverse. The Greek diet com-
prised mainly bread, olive oil, garlic, figs, and wild greens, with a little cheese, 
meat, or fish. Could a “finer” (kalliōn) meal really have been produced by the 
“potluck” process when the options were anyway so limited?24 Moreover, on 
the subject of meat, sacrificing and roasting whole animals was normal proce-
dure—a tricky thing to prepare in advance and take to a neighbor’s in a dish.25 
Ancient standards of hospitality present another problem. The guest–host rela-
tionship was literally sacred, to Hestia, goddess of hearth and feast, and Zeus 
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Xenios, protector of travelers, strangers, and guests. No self-respecting Greek 
householder could have proposed an evening’s entertainment on the condition 
that guests help out with the food and drink.26 Finally, whatever relation this 
passage bears to potluck dinners, another passage in the Politics suggests that 
Aristotle would have disapproved of them. At least, he disapproved of the 
Spartan requirement that all citizens, however poor, contribute to its public 
messes (syssitia); he preferred the Cretan system, in which such meals were 
provided from public funds, to which the poorest did not contribute.27
These points raise doubts that a potluck dinner is the relevant paradigm. 
The text does nothing to dispel them, though that is not obvious from most 
English translations. Common renderings of the feast terms include “a feast 
[or ‘feasts’] to which many contribute,”28 “a feast to which all contribute,”29 
“a feast to which all the guests contribute,”30 “a banquet to which many con-
tribute dishes,”31 and “potluck dinner” itself.32 Yet Aristotle says merely that 
the dinners are symphorēta, “collectively provided” (sym, “collectively” or 
“jointly”; phērō, “bring” or “provide”). This term is rarely attested: the only 
examples we have of it in connection with dining are the two under discus-
sion, which brings us to a dead end.33 Nonetheless, it certainly does not imply 
that those who eat the dinner also help to provide it, or that the contributions 
made are individual dishes. All we can say is that Aristotle thinks a better 
meal will be supplied by more than one person, and that he is concerned with 
cost: the contrast he draws is with a meal “from a single purse” (ek mias 
dapanēs), not one cooked “by a single chef.”34
The next claim is that the multitude’s contribution to political activity is 
knowledge. The main evidence for this appears in the second analogy, on 
aesthetic judgment. Most English translations feature the verb “understand” 
here, though “appreciate” is also seen: namely, “some appreciate one part, 
some another, and all together appreciate all.”35 Both suggest that Aristotle is 
concerned with some form of critical intellectual comprehension, but in the 
Greek there is actually no verb here at all. The relevant clause is highly trun-
cated, reading simply “some a certain part, others another, and everyone the 
whole.” An appropriate verb must be supplied by the translator. Many have 
opted for “understand” or “appreciate,” but it need be neither.
The suggestion that Aristotle is interested in the production of better-
informed decisions is also doubtful. What is described as “better” in the 
Greek text are not decisions, but rather the agents who make them and the act 
of judging itself. Aristotle says that many people can be “better” (beltious) 
than a single man, and that they judge “better” (ameinon), but he never 
describes a decision in this way. This might seem ultimately to come to the 
same thing,36 but a deeper issue is also at stake. The word better used here is 
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not epistemic but moral: beltios, like the adjective spoudaios that denotes the 
“good man” in the preceding clause, is an explicitly ethical term, suggesting 
“decent” or “morally serious,” not “well-informed” or “correct.”37 
Consequently, there is nothing in the passage to suggest that Aristotle is argu-
ing on epistemic lines.38
The final element of the accepted account is the link to the Athenian 
assembly. The “potluck dinner” paradigm certainly looks plausible here: dif-
ferent people contribute different points of view, and every contribution helps 
to shape the final decision. But the “potluck dinner” reading is dubious, as we 
have seen: it remains to consider the political context more closely.
First, there is no reason to think that Aristotle is referring to classical 
Athens. He was acquainted with hundreds of poleis, seldom mentioned 
Athens directly (as Eugene Garver has observed, he cited Sparta considerably 
more often)39 and is here making a general claim.40 It might be assumed that 
Aristotle is defending Athens if he is defending democracy, but there were 
many democracies in the ancient Greek world,41 and anyway, it is not clear 
that he is defending democracy, at least on his definition of it.42 He is cer-
tainly defending the political authority of a multitude, but this could as easily 
be a reference to politeia (the first of the two types of rule by a multitude that 
he identifies) as to dēmokratia.43 And since he supported politeia, but not 
dēmokratia, this would seem very probable; in which case classical Athens is 
irrelevant, for he certainly took it as an example of dēmokratia, indeed one of 
the most developed of its kind.44
It is thus unlikely that Aristotle was thinking of debates in the Athenian 
assembly. Indeed, he was most likely not thinking of debates in an assembly 
at all. He cites three specific examples of political activity in connection with 
this argument: elections to important offices such as generalships or treasury 
positions; euthynai or “audits,” the process of holding office-holders to 
account for their records; and judging cases in court.45 All of these tasks were 
often performed by large numbers of ordinary citizens—assemblygoers, in 
the case of elections, citizen-judges (dikastai) or councilors in the case of 
audits, and dikastai again in the courts—so Aristotle did not need to look to 
assembly debates for an example of mass political activity. Indeed, the only 
suggestion that debates are relevant here is his use of the verb bouleuomai, 
usually translated “deliberate” and taken to suggest group discussion.46 But 
this term could equally apply to decision making in elections, audits, and in 
court, so this does not get us very far.47
This leads to a crucial point. As we have seen, the accepted account of 
Aristotle’s argument affords an important role to speech as the medium 
through which diverse knowledge is shared; it is this that enables the best 
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decision to emerge. This comes through especially clearly in Waldron’s 
account: for him, the “doctrine of the wisdom of the multitude” forms “a kind 
of model or paradigm of our nature as speaking beings.”48 If the relevant 
political context were debate in an assembly, this might seem convincing. 
However, since Aristotle specifically cites elections, audits, and judging 
court cases, we need an interpretation that works in these situations, and here 
the accepted account falls short, since none of these activities—common 
throughout the ancient Greek world—ever, as far as we know, involved 
speech-making among the decision makers. In each case, decisions were 
made simply by voting, without prior discussion. In the case of elections, it is 
possible, though unlikely, that candidates or their proposers made a short 
speech before the vote, but it is highly unlikely that anyone else did so.49 
Canvassing occurred, if at all, outside the assembly;50 at meetings, decisions 
were made speedily, usually by show of hands.51 The situation in the courts is 
also clear. Aristotle reports that most legislators prohibited consultation 
(koinologountes) among judges prior to a verdict.52
Aristotle thus cannot have supported the political authority of the multi-
tude on the basis that it allowed diverse knowledge to be shared through 
public speech. Further confirmation of this is supplied by the text. Immediately 
after introducing this argument, Aristotle notes that it “would also apply to 
animals” (ta thēria). He sees this as a problem, and clarifies that the benefits 
of mass participation will arise only if the individuals involved have already 
achieved a certain level of virtue (aretē).53 But the striking fact, easily over-
looked, is that Aristotle thought that the argument, as it stood, could apply to 
animals.54 Hence, it cannot depend on something that animals cannot do. Yet 
the possession of logos, “articulate reason” or “speech,” was to Aristotle the 
crucial difference between humans and divine beings on the one hand, and all 
other living creatures on the other.55 Under no circumstances could he have 
supposed that his argument would also apply to animals if speech played any 
part in it. It follows that speech cannot be a key feature of the political situa-
tions that he has in mind.
The accepted account is thus surprisingly insecure. We should return to 
the analogies on which it rests and try to establish an alternative.
The First Analogy Reexamined
The “feast” analogy appears twice in the Politics, denoted first by ta 
symphorēta deipna, “collectively provided dinners,” and second, hestiasis 
symphorētos, “a collectively provided feast.”56 Given the context, these terms 
are presumably intended to be synonymous, yet the second formulation is 
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considerably more informative than the first. Deipnon, “dinner” or “meal,” 
was a common term in Greek, but hestiasis had a narrower meaning. It indi-
cated a significant event, often privately financed, but held for communal 
political, diplomatic, or religious purposes.57 In Athens, hestiasis had a par-
ticularly limited referent: it denoted the tribal dinner enjoyed during a major 
festival.58 Providing the dinner was a significant public service (leitourgia), 
akin to sponsoring a chorus or team of athletes, and as with the offices of 
chorēgos and gymnasiarchon, each hestiatōr (“public host”) was nominated 
from a list of 1200 individuals deemed wealthy enough to cover the event, and 
was supposed to be gratified by the honor of being asked.59
It is immediately obvious that such an event could not have resembled a 
potluck dinner. There were ten tribes in Athens, each consisting of several 
thousand citizens.60 Even if some stayed at home, inviting culinary contribu-
tions from attendees would have been a logistical nightmare, and rather than 
redounding to the honor of the organizer would have made him look con-
temptibly cheap.61 Nonetheless, that Aristotle had a feast of this kind in mind 
is suggested by three points in the text. First is his mention of cost (dapanē), 
which implies that the event posed a significant financial burden and that 
funding, rather than culinary excellence, was the crucial factor in its provi-
sion.62 Second is his use of the verb chorēgeō to describe the act of putting the 
dinner together.63 This is derived from the noun chorēgos, “chorus-sponsor,” 
and while it cannot prove that he had festival feasts in mind, it does make it 
seem likely. The third point concerns the adjective symphorētos, “collectively 
provided”. As we have seen, this term is obscure, yet one possible interpreta-
tion suggests itself. We know that during the fourth century, the Athenians 
moved away from funding public services exclusively through single, very 
wealthy individuals and began to draw on panels of fifteen or more moder-
ately wealthy individuals instead. Aristotle may be referring to a feast supplied 
in this way: that is, provided not by a single sponsor (nor by each attendee 
bringing a dish) but jointly funded by a committee.
Circumstantial evidence provides some support for this interpretation. Joint 
financing panels, or symmoriai, first appeared in Athens in 378/7 as a way of 
systematizing the payment of the war-tax, which fell only on the richest citi-
zens.64 From 358 a similar system was used to fund warships.65 We have no 
direct evidence that festival feasts were ever provided this way, but Demosthenes 
floated the idea in 355, and a “great revival and reorganization” of festival cer-
emonies occurred twenty years later, right around the time that Aristotle returned 
to Athens and began teaching the material in the Politics.66 Moreover, not only 
Athenian citizens but also wealthy foreign residents were liable to the perfor-
mance of festival offices; Aristotle may even have participated himself.67
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The major obstacle to this reading is the suggestion of Mogens Hansen that 
festival offices were always performed by single men.68 However, the evidence 
for this is not decisive. Hansen’s source, a speech of Demosthenes from 350 or 
348 which mentions the relevant nomination procedures, does, to be sure, list 
each office in the singular, which we might not expect if multiple nominations 
were the norm.69 But since Greek lacks an indefinite article, we cannot tell 
whether “the” or “a” hestiatōr, chorēgos, and gymnasiarchon are under discus-
sion here, and the appearance of the word trierarchon, “warship-sponsor,” also 
in the singular a few lines later—despite the fact that this speech was made 
several years after that office was opened to joint funding—suggests that “a” 
hestiatōr must be a plausible reading.70 In any case, even if festival feasts were 
sponsored singly down to 348, the reform might have occurred at a later date. 
On this evidence, the possibility that hestiaseis were jointly funded in the later 
fourth century cannot be ruled out.
If this interpretation is on the right lines, two points follow. First, contribu-
tions to the collectively provided feast will not have been individual dishes, 
but rather money (or conceivably resources in kind, such as livestock or 
grain), from which the entire feast was then provided. Just as modern gala 
events are organized by committees that take joint responsibility for raising 
and disbursing the entire budget (even if particular individuals take responsi-
bility for specific items), so too a hestiasis symphorētos was a collective 
undertaking performed by a joint agent disposing of common resources. This 
is significantly different from a “potluck dinner,” which is a collective under-
taking performed by multiple single agents whose individual contributions 
remain distinct in the final outcome (“Paula’s special pasta salad,” and so on).
Second, though it is possible that a collectively provided feast might be 
preferred because of the greater variety of dishes, it is unlikely in this context. 
Festival feasts were not especially varied: they comprised chiefly meat and 
bread.71 Additionally, collective funding for warships was introduced in order 
to build more ships, not to produce a more diverse fleet, and the goal in this 
case may have been similar.72 A collectively provided feast could be “finer” 
simply because it was bigger.73 More sponsors could mean more money 
spent overall, even if each gave considerably less than a single man under the 
previous system. In turn, this would mean more animals sacrificed and ulti-
mately more meat to eat, the major attraction of such events.74 It has been 
estimated that poorer households in Athens consumed 70–75 percent of their 
calorie intake in the form of grain; in these circumstances, it may have seemed 
obvious that what would make a meal “finer” was less “variety” than “abun-
dance,” and especially the abundance of meat.75 The analogy itself supports 
this reading. A more familiar example of a collectively provided good would 
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have been a warship; why should Aristotle have cited a feast instead? The 
relative novelty of the funding system may have been a factor, but more 
important may be the lack of correspondence between the money spent on a 
ship and the amount of ship produced. Extra resources would go to improving 
the ship in other ways: sheer size was not a relevant issue.76 If size was the 
relevant issue for Aristotle, however, we can see why the “feast” analogy 
might have seemed apt.
The Virtue of the Multitude
“Quantity,” not “variety,” thus lies at the heart of Aristotle’s “feast” analogy 
and motivates his support for the political authority of the multitude. Many 
relatively small amounts of something—in the “feast” case, money—can add 
up to a large total amount, surpassing even what could be provided by a 
single man or a few with a very large stock.77 What is contributed in the 
political context is stated in the next line. Every individual has a “portion” 
(morion) of aretē, “virtue” or “excellence,” and phronēsis, “wisdom,” “prac-
tical reason,” or “prudence,” or as Aristotle also puts it, “moral characteris-
tics” (ta ēthē) and “thought” (tēn dianoian). These “portions” are then united 
when many men come together, just as their feet, hands, and senses are 
united, making them “better” (beltious) than one man or a few.78
Aretē, in this context, presents little difficulty. It seems clear that it refers to 
the complex of moral virtues explored in Aristotle’s ethical writings, such as 
courage, justice, moderation, liberality, and so on.79 Aretē can also signify 
virtue in a general sense, including both moral and intellectual qualities, but 
when these aspects are distinguished, as here, it denotes the moral aspect 
alone.80 Additionally, the only moral virtues to feature regularly in the Politics 
are courage, justice, and moderation, so we may take these to be central here.81
Phronēsis is trickier to explicate. Though certainly an intellectual quality,82 it 
differs from technē (skill), epistēmē (scientific knowledge), sophia (wisdom), 
and nous (intelligence) in also being implicated in ethical activity. Both moral 
aretē and phronēsis are necessary for right action: moral virtue “ensures the right-
ness of the end we aim at,” phronēsis “the rightness of the means we adopt to gain 
that end.”83 At a deeper level, phronēsis is required to develop full moral virtue, 
while phronēsis without moral virtue is mere “cleverness.”84 Accordingly, when 
fully developed, moral virtue and phronēsis are inextricable,85 but this connection 
is difficult to convey in English. “Wisdom” is not an ideal translation, because 
while that term can signify a faculty of the intellect, which phronēsis is, it can also 
signify “that which is known” (as in, e.g., “a book full of wisdom”), which 
phronēsis is not. Particular knowledge does play a role in phronēsis, but the terms 
 at Harvard Libraries on March 28, 2013ptx.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
Cammack 185
are not synonymous.86 “Practical reason” is thus a better rendering, since it unam-
biguously suggests a faculty rather than an item or repository of knowledge, yet 
it too is not ideal, since the relation between phronēsis and logos, “reason,” is 
incomplete in Aristotle’s usage. Aristotle consistently describes human intellec-
tual (and ethical) capacities as “involving reason” (meta logou),87 but he also 
ascribes phronēsis (or at any rate a form of phronēsis) to certain animals, and 
animals do not possess logos.88 Given this, it seems better to avoid strictly intel-
lectual terms altogether and opt instead for “prudence” or “good sense,” with 
“sensible” for the related adjective phronimos.89
What a multitude contributes to political activity is thus each individual’s 
“portion” of moral virtue and prudence, or every form of aretē (in the general 
sense) except the higher intellectual virtues. Exactly what Aristotle meant by 
“portion” is uncertain: perhaps a single element of virtue, such as “courage” 
or “justice,” or perhaps a package of all combined.90 The analogy drawn 
between virtues and body parts (moriōn) in the Eudemian Ethics supports the 
latter:91 the correct reading of the reference to “one man” with “many feet, 
hands, and senses” would then be that just as each man puts both his feet, 
both his hands and each of his senses at the service of the group, so too he 
contributes his entire stock of justice, courage, moderation, and prudence. 
This question is relatively unimportant for our purposes, however;92 the main 
thing is that the result is clear. What Aristotle is talking about is the coming 
together of individual aretē when groups act collectively.
We may focus initially on one key point. Aristotle is discussing the aggre-
gation not of knowledge but of moral and intellectual capacities such as cour-
age, justice, moderation, and good sense. He is concerned not with what any 
given agent knows, but rather what he is like: how brave, just, moderate, 
sensible, and so on. This is a crucial distinction, because on Aristotle’s ethical 
theory, it is these qualities that determine what agents can do and how well 
they can do it. Plato argued that virtue was knowledge, but Aristotle explic-
itly rejected that view.93 To Aristotle, aretē was action-centered: it was a 
“power” (dynamis) of “providing and preserving good things.”94 Specifically, 
it had the “twofold effect” of rendering its possessor “good” (or, we might 
say, a good specimen of its kind) and causing it to “perform its function 
well.”95 It followed that an agent with more aretē could outperform one with 
less, and this, I suggest, is the foundation of Aristotle’s support for the politi-
cal authority of the multitude.
The idea that a group of people acting together can outperform even highly 
capable individuals is relatively common in ancient Greek political thought. 
Xenophon’s Hiero remarks that “nothing equals an organized body of men 
(syntetagmenoi), whether for protecting the property of friends or thwarting 
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the plans of enemies,” and one of Aesop’s fables suggests the same.96 
Demosthenes also expressed this view. The fabulously wealthy Meidias had 
“mercenaries to look after him” and “witnesses to come running . . . when he 
asks,” which was naturally “alarming to the rest of you as individuals, 
depending each upon his own resources.” The solution was to “band your-
selves together” (syllegesth’ hymeis):
so that when you find yourselves individually inferior (elattōn) to oth-
ers, whether in wealth or in friends or in any other respect, you may 
together prove stronger (kreittous) than any one of your enemies and 
so check his insolence.97
The obvious arena in which bands of individually inferior men can outper-
form their superiors is war, and this forms the crucial backdrop to Aristotle’s 
argument. In archaic Greek, aretē meant above all military prowess, and 
Aristotle also used it in this sense, as in the suggestion that conquerors pos-
sess more aretē by definition and hence have a just claim to rule.98 Yet war 
not only illustrated the link between greater numbers and greater power, it 
also indicated the greater efficacy achieved when a mass of men acts together. 
Though the figure of “one man” with “many feet, hands and senses” has been 
deemed “monstrous” by some, Aristotle may well have been thinking of a 
body of hoplites, whose strength lay precisely in their capacity to fight as 
one.99 Significantly, hoplites also formed the citizen body in a politeia, which 
Aristotle defended on the grounds that military virtue, unlike other forms of 
virtue, could exist in large numbers.100 Indeed, he even posited an etymologi-
cal connection between politeia and polemos (“war”) on this basis.101
Even if a mass of men can defeat their superiors in war, however, what 
does this have to do with voting in elections, audits, and court cases, when 
more than brute force is required? First, even military virtue, on Aristotle’s 
view, involved more than brute force. It included many elements of aretē,102 
particularly justice and courage.103 More broadly, Aristotle characterized all 
practical virtues—that is, every moral virtue, plus prudence—as useful in 
both war and politics.104 Indeed, these virtues sufficed for the “complete ful-
fillment of man’s proper function,” that is, the realization of a flourishing life 
in a polis.105 It is also possible that the moral virtues played a larger part in 
Aristotle’s conception of mass political activity. Not only were courage and 
justice, as key elements in military virtue, particularly associated with large 
numbers, but his confidence in the intellectual capacities of the multitude was 
typically low.106 Yet this did not necessarily make such men bad or useless 
citizens. Indeed, Aristotle observed that “some people seem to form opinions 
better, and yet choose the wrong things from wickedness.”107
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The same capacities that made a multitude useful in war could thus be 
expected to make it useful in politics. But a hard question follows. Even grant-
ing that more aretē might lead to greater success in these contexts, why should 
the “portions” of courage or justice or any other virtue of a mass of men be 
cumulative across a group? Why should a mass prove to be better than a single 
good man, when every individual falls short? Why should the group not prove 
as mediocre as its median member—or more vicious than any one of them?
This question has long puzzled readers who have seen the role of moral 
aretē in Aristotle’s account. Newman, in 1887, spotted that Aristotle’s prin-
ciple would “justify the inference that the larger the gathering is, the greater 
its capacity will be,” and responded: “Aristotle forgets that bad qualities will 
be thrown into the common stock no less than good . . . he forgets also the 
special liability of great gatherings of men to be mastered by feeling.”108 
Susemihl and Hicks likewise supposed that crowd emotion would inhibit 
rather than support virtue.109 Yet Aristotle does seem to have thought that 
aretē and crowd size were simply correlated. He likens aretē to wealth, 
strength, and weight, all of which increase arithmetically across groups.110 He 
states that a mass can be “stronger,” “richer,” and “better” than a few, appar-
ently all for the same reason;111 his conviction that aretē is purely beneficial 
may also have persuaded him that it was summative.112 He also explicitly 
believed that crowds are less likely to be swayed by emotion or other corrupt-
ing influences than smaller groups. At the second appearance of the “feast” 
analogy, he states that crowds make the best judges, both for the “feast-
related” reason and because they are more stable: “it is difficult to make a 
mass of men get angry and go wrong at the same time.”113 To be sure, this 
view directly contradicts modern notions of “mob justice,” but Aristotle’s 
presentation suggests that it was widely accepted among the Greeks.114
There is certainly a puzzle here, but a final twist in Aristotle’s argument 
may help to resolve it. Apparently, aretē can not only be aggregated in group 
contexts; it can also be amplified. Acting alone, Aristotle says, most men’s 
injustice and folly will lead them to behave badly and make mistakes:115 each 
is “immature in judgment.”116 But by “mingling with their betters” (mignu-
menoi tois beltoisi), the same men will become useful to the polis.117 This 
suggests that acting collectively can lead to both the aggregation of aretē 
within groups and its amplification within individuals. If so, mass political 
activity could be expected to produce something more than the sum of its 
parts—just as Waldron, in fact, suggested.118 In attributing this result to the 
dialectical quality of debate in the assembly, Waldron merely misdiagnosed 
the mechanism through which this phenomenon occurs.
One part of the puzzle is thus solved. If acting with others can be expected 
to increase the aretē of each individual, then the sum total of aretē across the 
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group will obviously increase when it acts together. Moreover, if this action 
includes voting, as in elections, audits, and court cases, we can even see how 
the aggregation of aretē would occur: the votes are simply added together.
Yet the underlying mystery remains. Why should we become more coura-
geous, just, moderate, or sensible when we act with others? Here we must 
return to the wider intellectual context. The idea that acting with or alongside 
others can strengthen individual virtue was another relatively common fea-
ture of Greek political thought. The effect could be gained in multiple ways: 
through moral support,119 emulation,120 rivalry or competition,121 the desire to 
impress an audience,122 or the fear of shame.123 Each mechanism pointed in 
the same direction: the presence of others would cause individuals to amplify 
socially valued characteristics and repress those that are disapproved, leading 
groups to act better and do more than single men.
Aristotle was an innovator in several respects, but not this one.124 He saw 
the value of rivalry and competition: “if all men vied with each other in moral 
nobility (pros ton kalon) and strove to perform the noblest deeds, the common 
welfare would be fully realized.”125 He recognized the importance of shame, 
especially for stimulating “civic courage,”126 and that the eyes of others were 
its “abode.”127 Most significantly, he believed that it was easier to practice 
aretē in groups than alone. This emerges most clearly in his discussion of 
friendship.128 The life of virtuous activity ought to be supremely pleasant, “yet 
a solitary man has a hard life, for it is not easy to keep up continuous activity 
by oneself; it is easier to do so with the aid of and in relation to other people” 
(meth’ heterōn kai pros allous). The life-work of the “good man” (ho spou-
daios) will thus be more “continuous” if “practiced with friends”; moreover, 
his society will supply “a sort of training in goodness” for others.129 This 
recalls the claim that men become useful by “mingling with their betters”; 
evidently, good models are important, and this is confirmed elsewhere. 
Friendship between “inferior people” is evil, for they take part in inferior pur-
suits, but friendship between the good is good, for they “become better by 
practising friendship and correcting each other’s faults, as each takes the 
impress from the other of those traits in him that give him pleasure.”130 This 
suggests that the benefits of collective political activity will emerge only if the 
parties involved have already achieved a certain level of aretē—which is pre-
cisely the point Aristotle makes about the non-applicability of this argument to 
animals.131 Notably, however, this condition is met in a politeia, where all citi-
zens possess at least military virtue. In that context, acting “with the aid of 
others” could certainly be expected to increase aretē across the board.
This interpretation may not be self-evident. Yet neither is it particularly 
far-fetched. Indeed, especially in relation to the positive effects of moral 
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support and the desire to avoid shame, it is arguable that something like 
Aristotle’s reasoning is accepted even today. Courage presents the most obvi-
ous example. Individuals are commonly braver in groups than alone: this is 
frequently observed in wars and revolutions, and the same dynamic can be 
imagined in the political situations that Aristotle has in mind. Recall that 
elections in ancient Greece were normally decided publicly, by show of 
hands: individuals might well have felt bolder in their choice-making if they 
could see that others shared their view. Or take the case of a general accused 
of treason: one-on-one, an ordinary citizen might have felt too awed to 
demand punishment, though he could do so as one of a crowd.132 Justice may 
seem harder to interpret on these lines, given the modern skepticism of “mob 
justice” (which, as we saw above, however, Aristotle did not share). Yet we 
should remember that justice, for the ancient Greeks, was intrinsically other-
regarding, and that judicial activity explicitly concerned what is due the polis 
as a whole; the presence of other members of the community might well have 
helped  individual judges to keep that end in view.133 Moderation, also, can be 
boosted by moral support, as anyone who has dieted knows, and its role in the 
use of wealth could plausibly be enhanced if the eyes of others encouraged 
self-restraint.134 Finally, it is significant that Aristotle specifically defines 
phronēsis in the political sphere as the capacity to discern the common inter-
est (to koinē sympheron).135 It is surely easier to focus on what is common, 
rather than one’s private interests, when acting as one of a crowd. Moreover, 
there may even be an internal connection between phronēsis and crowd size: 
at least, a larger decision-making group will by definition give a better indi-
cation of what the whole community  takes the common interest to be.
The theme here is thus not the positive effects of diverse knowledge on deci-
sion making but the benefits of collective activity on individual and group aretē. 
Collective action by sufficiently virtuous individuals can boost each man’s stock 
of justice, courage, moderation, and prudence, thus increasing the effectiveness 
of the entire group. As Aristotle notes, this argument does not support men of the 
multitude acting as generals or treasury officials, since those tasks must be per-
formed by single men.136 But they can certainly participate in any tasks open to 
collective authorship, such as electing men to office and judging them in court.137 
The only condition is that the aretē of the group reaches the necessary standard. 
A group of animals will never reach it (and, Aristotle asserts, some men are not 
so dissimilar from animals). Also, if the polis includes some man or men of 
exceptional virtue, the multitude will fall short in comparison (which is why 
Aristotle turns next to the discussion of ostracism and kingship). But if and 
when the aretē of a multitude exceeds that of other subsets within the polis, 
Aristotle accepts that it will have a claim to political authority.
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It may be asked how the “amplificatory effect” discussed here fits with the 
interpretation of the “feast” analogy given above. Surely the same dynamic 
cannot be seen in that case? Actually, it is not implausible that competition 
for honor might lead each sponsor to contribute more than he had originally 
anticipated. If so, the superiority of the collectively provided feast would 
result not only from the fact that the aggregated funds of a group can exceed 
those supplied by a single man. It would also reflect the increased size of each 
contribution made when men act together.
The Second Analogy Reexamined
We may now ask how this account fits with the second analogy, that concern-
ing aesthetic judgment. Aristotle says that just as a multitude, when it comes 
together, becomes “one man with many feet and many hands and many 
senses,” so too it unites its ethical qualities (ta ēthē) and thought (dianoia), 
and adds that “this is also why many people judge better of both musical 
productions and the works of the poets: for some a certain part (morion), 
others another, and everyone the whole.”138
The idea that a multitude can judge artistic productions better than a small 
number—for instance, the ten men appointed to judge dramatic competitions 
at the Dionysia—is certainly historically plausible.139 Aristotle may have 
been thinking of Euripides, who won few prizes in his own day but was 
always a great favorite with audiences (and especially the poor), and by 
Aristotle’s time was accepted as one of the great tragic poets alongside 
Aeschylus and Sophocles.140 Or he may have had Aristophanes in mind, 
whose Clouds was placed third by the judges, despite the audience having 
“noisily demanded that it be put first on the list.”141 How do these cases sup-
port the account given so far?
The crux of the matter is how to supply the missing verb in the clause 
“some a certain part, some another, and everyone the whole.” As we saw 
above, a common solution is “understand,” although “appreciate” is also seen; 
a third possibility is “judge.”142 Of these, “judge” is preferable on syntactical 
grounds, since this verb appears in the previous clause, and Greek verbs are 
more commonly ellipsed than repeated. However, another approach is also 
possible. Arguably the most striking feature of the second analogy is the term 
morion, “portion” or “part.” This term was used in the previous line to describe 
the “portion” of moral virtue and prudence supplied by each member of the 
multitude when the group acts together, but in the second analogy it has always 
been understood to have a different referent: the “parts” or “aspects” of the 
music or play judged by the multitude. That referent is implied whether the 
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verb supplied is “understood,” “appreciate,” or “judge”: in each case, what is 
divided into parts is the object of the multitude’s attention. The act of judg-
ment is thus conceived in terms of a division of labor: each member of the 
group understands (or appreciates, or judges) a different part of the work, and 
as such the whole group understands (or appreciates, or judges) the whole.
An alternative interpretation is that the term morion may refer to the same 
thing in both cases. In both, Aristotle may be referring to the “portion” of 
aretē supplied by each member of the group when it acts together. On this 
reading, a possible rendering of the missing verb would be “supply” or “pro-
vide” (taking a cue from pherō, the root of the term symphorētos seen in the 
“feast” analogy): namely, “some supply a certain part [of the aretē supplied 
overall], others another, and everyone the whole.” On this view, what is 
divided into portions is not the object of the multitude’s attention, that is, the 
work of music or poetry, or (in the political context) the candidate in an elec-
tion, office-holder in an audit, or litigant in court; that object is always 
regarded as a whole. Rather, what is in “parts” are the multitude’s shares of 
ethical virtue and prudence, all of which are mobilized in the act of collective 
judgment.
As far as I know, there is no linguistic or syntactical obstacle to reading the 
text this way. It could only be ruled out if we knew for certain what the “por-
tion” mentioned in the second analogy is a portion of, and we lack that infor-
mation. Yet this interpretation is not only more parsimonious than the usual 
approach, it also works better in context. Aristotle’s next point is that what 
distinguishes a good single man from a mass of people is that the good man 
comprises in himself all the parts of aretē that, in the mass, are found scat-
tered about. This is often regarded as a new thought, or even an objection to 
the previous one, but on the view given here it is a continuation of the same 
reasoning about the “parts” and the “whole” of virtue that governs the rest of 
the passage. Aristotle’s discussion of music in Book 8 of the Politics also 
supports this reading: the argument of that section concerns the importance of 
moral virtue for judging music correctly,143 and while a strictly epistemic 
reading of audience response to artistic performance will struggle to draw 
these two parts of the Politics together, on the present interpretation they are 
fully compatible.144 Even Aristotle’s comment on animals makes sense in this 
light, since he observes that some animals enjoy music.145
Most significantly, this interpretation suits the political situations that 
Aristotle mentions. For one thing, it is not obvious that either voters in elec-
tions or judges in court judge purely on the basis of “knowledge” (or even 
conscious thought), and the ancient Greeks certainly did not think that they 
did. Judging by “character,” which drew on the judge’s own ethical virtue and 
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prudence, was entirely acceptable, even expected.146 For another, it is not 
clear that a “division of labor” model adequately captures how multitudes 
judge either political actors or works of art. Certainly, different individuals 
will weigh different aspects of the judged object differently, but it does not 
follow that each responds only to a single aspect: more plausibly, each 
responds to the object as a whole, though in different ways. Certainly, this 
was assumed in Greek dramatic competitions, where there was no tradition of 
scoring acting, dancing, writing, costumes and so on separately. Rather, pro-
ductions were judged against each other as wholes.147
This reading confirms the interpretation of the “feast” analogy advanced 
above. If Aristotle was indeed thinking in terms of collective agency, it would 
logically have been impossible for him to draw a strict one-to-one correspon-
dence between each man’s contribution to a collective act and a specific “por-
tion” of the task at hand. On the interpretation of the argument offered here, 
something is added when groups act collectively that cannot be traced back to 
any single individual, but is rather an emergent property of the mass. This is a 
very different conception of popular political activity from that implied in the 
usual account of this argument. On that view, the collectively produced out-
come can be traced back to individual contributions in a straightforward way: 
one spectator understands one part of a performance, another another; hence 
together they understand the whole. Nothing is incorporated into the final out-
come that is not already possessed by each contributor, conceived separately. 
But when Aristotle states the argument, he does not suggest that what happens 
when a multitude comes together is that each person is individually responsi-
ble for a discrete part of the collectively produced outcome. Rather, he says 
that everyone contributes his “portion” of ethical virtue and prudence to the 
collective agent, the “one man” with many hands, feet, and senses, by whom 
the outcome is ultimately produced, and this is a profoundly different idea.148
The easiest way to illustrate this difference is to revert to the contrast 
between a potluck dinner and a collectively provided feast. In the potluck, each 
part of the dinner–each dish–can be traced back to the individual who origi-
nally contributed it: the meal is the sum of numerous distinct acts. In the col-
lectively provided feast, however, the whole feast is the result of a single 
collective act, enabled by numerous contributions to a single fund. It would be 
impossible to assign any “part” of this feast to an individual sponsor: rather, the 
whole panel is collectively responsible for the whole. Arguably, Aristotle has a 
similar conception of political activity. At a fundamental level, he does not 
imagine that the activity of the polis can be broken down into several distinct 
parts, attributable to each single citizen within the community. Rather, the 
whole polis is ultimately implicated in the flourishing of the whole, because the 
aretē of each part is involved in the successful self-development of the rest.149
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Conclusion
On the usual account of the argument explored here, Aristotle thought that a 
multitude can make better decisions by pooling its knowledge than individu-
als or small groups can make alone. Mass political activity thus resembled a 
potluck dinner or an audience judging a play: a greater variety of contribu-
tions could produce a better result. I have suggested that Aristotle’s support 
for the political authority of some multitudes rested not on their access to 
diverse knowledge but rather on his belief that the ethical qualities and good 
sense of single men can be aggregated and even amplified when they act 
together. A multitude thus has a claim to rule whenever its aretē exceeds that 
of other groups within the polis, so long as its acts can be jointly authored.
This account detaches Aristotle from those who would wish to cite him in 
support of democracy on epistemic grounds. However, it need not diminish 
his significance for democrats today. I will close by suggesting where this 
significance lies.
Let us return to Waldron’s suggestion that Aristotle’s argument “stands as a 
kind of model or paradigm of our nature as speaking beings.” As we have 
seen, this must be false, since speech does not feature in Aristotle’s examples 
of political activity, nor does it fit his contention that his argument would also 
apply to animals. Yet there is deeper misconception at work in Waldron’s 
interpretation, which takes us to the very heart of Aristotle’s political thought. 
The problem lies in the supposition that Aristotle regarded logos, “articulate 
reason” or “speech,” as the defining mark of man’s nature as a “political ani-
mal.”150 He certainly believed that logos made man more “political” than any 
other animal, but it cannot define political animals as such, because while 
other animals—bees, ants, and cranes, for example—are also “political” on 
Aristotle’s account, man alone possesses logos.151 What defined a political 
animal was in fact not the capacity to speak, but being engaged in “some one 
common activity” (hen ti kai koinon . . . to ergon).152 In other words, acting 
collectively, not reasoning, was to Aristotle the fundamental political activity.
I suggest that this perspective may prove salutary for contemporary politi-
cal theory. The current enthusiasm for epistemic defenses of democratic 
authority faces a potential problem: what if the decisions of the multitude turn 
out not to be “better,” on epistemic grounds, after all? What if mistakes are 
made that could have been avoided under “expert” guidance? Does that mean 
that ordinary people should be excluded from political authority? To Plato, the 
obvious answer to this question was yes, but democrats will find that less 
appealing. There are ways of getting around this problem in its own terms,153 
but on Aristotle’s view, this is simply the wrong way to think about political 
activity. The great interest of Aristotle’s account is that he does not 
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base political authority on the contingent possession of potentially useful 
information but rather on a range of ethical and intellectual capacities that, 
given the right training and external conditions, can be widely shared.154 To be 
sure, the benefits of collective political action will emerge only if most mem-
bers of a community actually value such qualities as courage, justice, modera-
tion, and good sense; if cowardice, viciousness, intemperance, and folly are 
widely tolerated, this cannot happen. However, this merely underscores the 
significance of a point made immediately prior to this argument in the Politics, 
which is that true poleis are distinguished from mere “alliances” precisely by 
their attention to aretē.155 It does not follow that those who participate in polit-
ical authority on this basis must be a small group; to the contrary, Aristotle’s 
conception of what is politically valuable might well prove more hospitable to 
democratic aspirations today than the currently admired epistemic approach.
The question remains what this might mean in practice, and here we can 
reconsider the historical context that Aristotle had in mind. As observed ear-
lier, there is no reason to think that his argument applied particularly to clas-
sical Athens. He does, however, link it clearly to Athens in an earlier era, that 
of Solon in the early sixth century. Solon is cited approvingly as the lawgiver 
who gave the Athenian plēthos the right to take part in elections and audits, 
while his judicial reforms, which gave ordinary Athenians control over the 
administration of justice, are discussed elsewhere in a positive light.156 This 
ought to be very striking to modern democrats. Aristotle evidently believed 
that his argument supported the kind of mass political participation intro-
duced by Solon. This system was certainly less democratic than classical 
Athens: for example, there was no general right to speak in the assembly. Yet 
it was still considerably more democratic than any modern democracy, judged 
by the extent of the powers enjoyed by ordinary citizens. Then as now, citi-
zens had the power to elect their leaders, but the Greek practice of routinely 
holding those leaders to account has no equivalent today, and the fact that 
supreme judicial power was wielded by large bodies of ordinary citizens 
without any legal training is also unparalleled. Most people today would 
probably agree that hearing court cases, pronouncing final verdicts, and set-
ting appropriate penalties requires special knowledge and expertise, and thus 
cannot be done satisfactorily by a mass of ordinary citizens. This confident 
sense of the limits of mass political activity was shared by Plato, and is read-
ily justified by an epistemic account of political competence. It was not 
shared by Aristotle, however, and the failure of some of his recent readers to 
see this may reveal not only a deficiency in the contemporary interpretation 
of Aristotle but in the contemporary conception of democracy as well.
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